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Abstract
Notwithstanding the extensive work on iterated be-
lief revision, there is, still, no fully satisfactory so-
lution within the classical AGM paradigm. The
seminal work of Darwiche and Pearl (DP approach,
for short) remains the most dominant, despite its
well-documented shortcomings. In this article, we
make further observations on the DP approach.
Firstly, we prove that the DP postulates are, in a
strong sense, inconsistent with Parikh’s relevance-
sensitive axiom (P), extending previous initial con-
flicts. Immediate consequences of this result are
that an entire class of intuitive revision operators,
which includes Dalal’s operator, violates the DP
postulates, as well as that the Independence postu-
late and Spohn’s conditionalization are inconsistent
with (P). Lastly, we show that the DP postulates al-
low for more revision polices than the ones that can
be captured by identifying belief states with total
preorders over possible worlds, a fact implying that
a preference ordering (over possible worlds) is an
insufficient representation for a belief state.
1 Introduction
The celebrated “AGM paper”, [Alchourro´n et al., 1985], laid
the foundations of what is now called the AGM paradigm for
belief revision [Ga¨rdenfors, 1988; Peppas, 2008]. Within this
framework, the beliefs of an agent are modelled as a logical
theory K, also called a belief set, epistemic input is repre-
sented as a logical sentence ', and the revision of K by ',
denoted by K  ', is modelled as a function  mapping the-
ories and sentences to theories. Revision functions are con-
strained by eight postulates, the AGM postulates for revision,
introduced to capture the notion of rationality in the context
of belief change. The functions that satisfy these postulates
are known as AGM revision functions.
One of the main shortcomings of the original AGM
paradigm is its lack of any guidelines for iterated belief re-
vision — see [Peppas, 2014] for a survey on this issue. Per-
haps the most influential work addressing the problem of it-
erated revision, within the confines of the AGM paradigm, is
Darwiche and Pearl’s approach; for short, DP approach [Dar-
wiche and Pearl, 1994]. In the DP approach, four new postu-
lates were introduced, namely, the DP postulates, to regulate
the process of iterated revision.
However, as originally introduced in [Darwiche and Pearl,
1994], not all the DP postulates were consistent with the
AGM postulates for revision [Lehmann, 1995]. The incon-
sistency was later resolved in [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997], by
defining revision functions to operate on belief states, rather
than on belief sets. With the switch to belief states, Darwiche
and Pearl modified the AGM postulates for revision accord-
ingly; we shall refer to the functions satisfying these modified
postulates as modified AGM revision functions.
Even so, the DP approach remains controversial. The crit-
icism, typically, comes in the form of counter-examples in
which the DP postulates produce unintuitive results; see, for
example, [Konieczny and Pe´rez, 2000; Jin and Thielscher,
2007; Stalnaker, 2009]. One of the latest criticism consti-
tutes the result of [Peppas et al., 2008], that points out a first
conflict between each one of the DP postulates and Parikh’s
relevance-sensitive axiom (P), introduced in [Parikh, 1999] as
an attempt to capture relevance in belief revision.
In this work, we make further observations on the DP ap-
proach. In particular:
 The main incompatibility result of [Peppas et al., 2008]
has been proved assuming a set of propositional variables
with fixed cardinality; hence, it is confined to only one type
of modified AGM revision functions. Specifically, Pep-
pas et al. proved their result for modified AGM revision
functions defined over a propositional language built from
only three variables, utilizing a particular theory of the
language. Herein, we provide a fully-fledged incompati-
bility result between relevance-sensitive and iterated be-
lief revision, extending the result of [Peppas et al., 2008]
for any finite, non-empty set of propositional variables, as
well as for any splittable or (non-trivially) confined the-
ory. Hence, the possibility for modified AGM revision
functions of any type to satisfy both axiom (P) and the DP
postulates is excluded.
 The aforementioned incompatibility results imply sig-
nificant corollaries for existing belief-change proposals.
Parametrized Difference revision operators [Peppas and
Williams, 2016; 2018], and their specialization Dalal’s
operator [Dalal, 1988], are incompatible with the DP ap-
proach. Moreover, the Independence postulate [Jin and
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Thielscher, 2007] (that remedies problems with the DP
postulates) and the well-known Spohn’s conditionaliza-
tion [Spohn, 1988] (restricted to revision scenarios) are
incompatible with axiom (P).
 We discuss the relation between belief states and total
preorders over possible worlds, and prove that the one-
to-one correspondence between them is not sufficient to
“cover” all possible revision policies aligned with the DP
postulates. This result implies that a preference order-
ing (over worlds) is an insufficient structure for repre-
senting a belief state. This “non-reductionist” view was
also recently supported in [Booth and Chandler, 2017;
2018], where relevant considerations were provided.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next
section, we fix some notation and terminology. Then, as-
suming basic knowledge of the AGM paradigm, the DP ap-
proach is introduced. The subsequent section presents the
fully-fledged incompatibility results between the DP postu-
lates and axiom (P), whereas Section 5 presents their direct
consequences. Section 6 studies the relation between belief
states and total preorders over possible worlds. The last sec-
tion is devoted to some concluding remarks.
2 Formal Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we work with a finite, non-empty set
of propositional variables P . We define L to be the proposi-
tional language generated fromP , using the standard Boolean
connectives, the special symbol ? (Falsity), and governed by
classical propositional logic. The logic is identified by its
consequence operation Cn and/or by its inference relation
j=; see [Alchourro´n et al., 1985] for their formal properties.
A sentence ' 2 L is contingent iff 2 ' and 2 :'. For a
set of sentences   of L, Cn( ) denotes the set of all log-
ical consequences of  ; i.e., Cn( ) = f' 2 L :   j=
'g. We shall write Cn('1; : : : ; 'n) as an abbreviation of
Cn
 f'1; : : : ; 'ng. A theory (belief set) K of L is any set of
sentences of L closed under Cn; i.e., K = Cn(K).
A literal is a propositional variable p 2 P or its negation.
We define a possible world (abbrev. world) r to be a con-
sistent set of literals, such that, for any propositional variable
p 2 P , either p 2 r or :p 2 r. Sometimes, we treat a set
of literals as a sentence, i.e., the conjunction of all its literals,
leaving it to the context to resolve any ambiguity. The set of
all possible worlds is denoted by M. For a sentence (set of
sentences) ', ['] is the set of worlds at which ' is true. For a
set of worlds V , th(V ) is the set of sentences (theory) satis-
fied by all worlds in V . If V = ?, then we define th(V ) = L.
Let Q be a (strict) subset of P . We denote by LQ the sub-
language of L defined over Q. If Q = ?, we take LQ to be
the language generated by ?, and the Boolean connectives.
For a sentence x of L, we denote by Lx the unique minimal
sublanguage of L, within which we can write a sentence that
is logically equivalent to x. If x is inconsistent or a tautology,
we take Lx to be L?. Moreover, Lx denotes the complement
language of Lx; that is, the language built from the proposi-
tional variables that do not appear in Lx.
Lastly, some definitions on preorders. A preorder over a
set V is any reflexive, transitive binary relation in V . The
preorder  is called total iff, for all r; r0 2 V , r  r0 or
r0  r. We shall write r  r0 iff r  r0 and r0  r. We shall
also write r  r0 iff r  r0 and r0  r. In addition, for any
X  V , by min(X;) we denote the set fr 2 X : for all
r0 2 X , if r0  r, then r  r0g.
For ease of presentation, we shall consider only consistent
belief sets, and contingent epistemic input.
3 The DP Approach
One of the most influential proposals addressing the problem
of iterated belief revision, that comply with the assumptions
of the AGM paradigm, is the work of Darwiche and Pearl
[Darwiche and Pearl, 1994]. This proposal was later modi-
fied in [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997], partially in response to
a problem identified in [Lehmann, 1995].1 In the modified
version, Darwiche and Pearl defined revision functions to op-
erate on belief states (rather than on belief sets), and reformu-
lated accordingly the AGM postulates for revision — hence,
they slightly deviated from the AGM paradigm.2 As stated,
we shall call a function  a modified AGM revision function
iff it satisfies the modified AGM postulates for revision, to
differentiate it from the one in the original AGM paradigm.
Clearly,  is a function that maps a belief state S and a sen-
tence ' of L to a new belief state S  '.
Darwiche and Pearl did not fully specify what exactly they
consider a belief state to be. What was clear from their ex-
position is that, to each belief state S, corresponds a belief
set B(S), and, moreover, it is possible to assign the same be-
lief set to different belief states. This latter feature of belief
states is crucial for resolving the original inconsistency iden-
tified by Lehmann. Herein, although this is not required by
the DP approach, we shall identify a belief state with a special
kind of total preorder over all possible worlds, called faithful
preorder, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Definition 1 (Faithfulness, [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991;
Darwiche and Pearl, 1997]). For a belief state S, a preorder
S over the possible worlds of M is faithful to B(S) iff it is
total, and such that the minimal worlds (with respect to S)
are those satisfying B(S); i.e., min(M;S) = [B(S)].
Darwiche and Pearl proved that, for any revision function
 that satisfies the modified AGM postulates for revision, any
belief state S and any ' 2 L, the following condition, de-
noted by ( ), holds: B(S  ') = th min(['];S).
Given the aforementioned background, Darwiche and
Pearl introduced four additional postulates, known as the DP
postulates, to regulate the process of iterated revision.
(DP1) If ' j=  , then B (S   )  ' = B(S  ').
(DP2) If ' j= : , then B (S   )  ' = B(S  ').
(DP3) If  2 B(S  '), then  2 B (S   )  '.
(DP4) If : 62 B(S  '), then : 62 B (S   )  '.
There is a one-to-one correspondence between (DP1)–
(DP4) and the following constraints on possible worlds:
1Lehmann showed that one of the DP postulates, as originally
stated, was inconsistent with the AGM postulates for revision.
2Due to space limitations, the modified AGM postulates for revi-
sion have been omitted; see [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997] for details.
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(R1) If r; r0 2 ['], then r S r0 iff r S' r0.
(R2) If r; r0 2 [:'], then r S r0 iff r S' r0.
(R3) If r 2 ['] and r0 2 [:'], then r S r0 entails r S' r0.
(R4) If r 2 ['] and r0 2 [:'], then r S r0 entails r S' r0.
4 Relevance and the DP Postulates
Despite relevance and iteration seem to be unrelated at first
glance, dealing with different aspects of the revision process,
it turns out that each one of the DP postulates is, in a strong
sense, incompatible with Parikh’s axiom (P).
4.1 Parikh’s Notion of Relevance
Relevant change is not properly addressed in the classical
AGM paradigm, as identified by Parikh [Parikh, 1999]. Ac-
cordingly, Parikh proposed a new axiom, named (P), to sup-
plement the AGM postulates for revision. Axiom (P) was
further analysed in [Peppas et al., 2015], where two different
interpretations of it were identified, called the weak and the
strong version of (P).3 The weak version of (P), denoted by
(wP), is sufficient for the promised results. Peppas et al. in-
troduced (wP) in terms of belief sets. However, it can quite
straightforwardly be recast in terms of belief states, simply by
replacing K with B(S) and K  ' with B(S  '):
(wP) If B(S) = Cn(x; y), Lx \ Ly = ?, and ' 2 Lx,
then B(S  ') \ Lx = B(S) \ Lx.
Condition (wP) says that the revision of S by ' will not
affect any belief content outside Lx. In order to present
the possible-world characterization of (wP), as introduced in
[Peppas et al., 2015], we need some additional terminology.4
Definition 2 (Diff). The difference between two worlds w, r
of M, denoted by Diff (w; r), is: Diff (w; r) = fp 2 P :
w j= p and r j= :pg [ fp 2 P : w j= :p and r j= pg.
The definition of Diff can be extended to include the differ-
ence between a theory of L and a world of M. To this end,
the subsequent definition is necessary.
Definition 3 (Theory Splitting, [Parikh, 1999]). Let K be a
theory of L, and let Q = fQ1; : : : ; Qng be a partition of P;
i.e.,
S
Q = P , Qi 6= ?, and Qi \ Qj = ?, for all 1 6 i 6=
j 6 n. The set Q is a K-splitting iff there exist sentences
'1 2 LQ1 ; : : : ; 'n 2 LQn , such that K = Cn('1; : : : ; 'n).
For every theory K of L, there is a unique finest K-
splitting, denoted by F ; i.e., one which refines every other
K-splitting [Parikh, 1999].5
Definition 4 (Extended Diff, [Peppas et al., 2015]). Let K be
a theory of L, and let F be the finest K-splitting. The differ-
ence between K and a world r of M, denoted by Diff (K; r),
is: Diff (K; r) =
SfFi 2 F : for some ' 2 LFi , K j= '
and r j= :'g.
3In the same work, it was shown that (P) is consistent with the
full set of AGM postulates for revision.
4For the epistemic-entrenchment characterization of (wP), refer
to [Aravanis et al., 2017].
5A partitionQ0 refines another partitionQ iff, for everyQ0i 2 Q0,
there is a Qj 2 Q, such that Q0i  Qj .
In the special case of a complete theory K (i.e., [K] is a
singleton), Definition 4 collapses to Definition 2. Having de-
fined the extended Diff, the possible-world characterization
of (wP) (in terms of belief states) is the following conditions:
(SQ1) If Diff (B(S); r)  Diff (B(S); r0) and Diff (r; r0)
\ Diff (B(S); r) = ?, then r S r0.
(SQ2) If Diff (B(S); r) = Diff (B(S); r0) and Diff (r; r0)
\ Diff (B(S); r) = ?, then r S r0.
Finally, and before proceeding with the incompatibility re-
sults, we introduce the following useful definition:
Definition 5 (Splittable/Confined Theory). Let K be a the-
ory of L. Iff, for some contingent sentences x; y 2 L,
K = Cn(x; y) andLx\Ly = ?, we shall say thatK is split-
table. Iff, for some contingent sentence x 2 L, K = Cn(x)
and Lx  L, we shall say that K is confined (to Lx).
Note that, ifK is confined to a sublanguage L0 of L, it also
“splits” between L0 and L0; the L0 part is trivial. Moreover,
there is no sentence  2 L0, such that K j= .
4.2 Main Incompatibility Results
Theorem 1. LetK be any splittable theory of L. There exists
a belief state S, associated with K, and a sentence ' of L,
such that no modified AGM revision function  satisfies (P) at
S and S', in addition to any of the postulates (DP1)–(DP4).
Proof. Let K be any theory of L, such that, for some contin-
gent sentences x; y 2 L, K = Cn(x; y) and Lx \ Ly = ?.
We will show that there exists a belief state S associated with
K, such that, for some sentence ' of L, the transition from
S to S' cannot obey the dictates of (SQ1)–(SQ2), in ad-
dition to the dictates of each one of (R1)–(R4).
To this end, consider any belief state S, such that B(S) =
K, and assume that (SQ1)–(SQ2) and (R1)–(R4) are satis-
fied. Moreover, suppose that Fx, Fy are two elements of the
finest B(S)-splitting, such that Fx, Fy contain propositional
variables of Lx, Ly , respectively.
 Violation of (R1):
Let w be any B(S)-world. Consider a world r00, such
that it disagrees with all B(S)-worlds on some proposi-
tional variables in Fx and in Fy (i.e., r00\LFx 6= w0\LFx
and r00 \ LFy 6= w0 \ LFy , for all w0 2 [B(S)]), and it
agrees with w on the remaining variables (if any, namely,
in case P   (Fx [ Fy) 6= ?). Then, Diff (B(S); r00) =
Fx [ Fy , and thus r00 =2 [B(S)].6 Moreover, consider the
two worlds r, r0, such that r = (r00\LFx)[ (w\LP Fx)
and r0 = (r00 \ LFy ) [ (w \ LP Fy ) (see Figure 1).7
6To see that Diff (B(S); r00) contains the propositional variables
of Fx, observe that, by the choice of r00, there is a sentence  2
LFx (i.e.,  = r00 \ LFx ), such that K j= : and r00 j= . The
same applies for Fy . To see that Diff (B(S); r00) contains only the
propositional variables of Fx and Fy , suppose towards contradiction
that this is not the case (of course, in case P   (Fx [ Fy) 6= ?).
Then, there is a sentence  2 LP (Fx[Fy), such that K j=  and
r00 j= :. This again entails that w j= , contradicting the fact that
w and r00 agree on the variables outside Fx [ Fy .
7It is not hard to verify that the worlds r; r0; r00 indeed exist.
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Then, Diff (B(S); r) = Fx, Diff (B(S); r0) = Fy (see
Footnote 6), and thus r; r0 =2 [B(S)].
Therefore, we derive that Diff (B(S); r) 
Diff (B(S); r00) and Diff (r; r00) \ Diff (B(S); r) = ?,
and Diff (B(S); r0)  Diff (B(S); r00) and Diff (r0; r00)
\ Diff (B(S); r0) = ?. Then from (SQ1), it follows
that r S r00 and r0 S r00. Since Diff (B(S); r) \
Diff (B(S); r0) = ?, (SQ1)–(SQ2) place no constraints
on the relative order of r and r0, with respect to S (these
two worlds are Diff-incomparable).
Now, consider the particular belief state, and call this
S from now on, where it holds that r S r0 S r00.
Define ' to be the sentence ' = r _ r0 _ r00. Ac-
cording to the definition of S , there is only one S-
minimal '-world, namely r; therefore from ( ), it fol-
lows that

B(S  ') = frg. Then, again by the choice of
r0; r00, we derive that Diff
 
B(S  '); r00 = Diff (r; r00) 
Diff
 
B(S  '); r0 = Diff (r; r0). Hence, no matter what
the new faithful preorder S' is, as long as it satisfies
(SQ1), it holds that r00 S' r0.
However, given that r0; r00 2 ['] and r0 S r00, (R1)
entails that r0 S' r00. Contradiction.
 Violation of (R2):
Consider the three worlds r; r0; r00 =2 [B(S)] of the pre-
vious case. As stated, the fact that r S r00 and r0 S r00
holds for any belief state S associated with K. Define
' to be the sentence ' = r. Therefore from ( ), it
follows that

B(S  ') = frg. Then, we derive that
Diff
 
B(S  '); r00 = Diff (r; r00)  Diff  B(S  '); r0
= Diff (r; r0). Hence, no matter what the new faithful pre-
order S' is, as long as it satisfies (SQ1), it holds that
r00 S' r0.
However, given that r0; r00 2 [:'] and r0 S r00, (R2)
entails that r0 S' r00. Contradiction.
 Violation of (R3) and (R4):
Assume the aforementioned three worlds r; r0; r00 =2
[B(S)], and consider again the particular belief state S
where r S r0 S r00. Defining ' = r _ r0, we can
derive the desired contradictions, with a totally analogous
reasoning. 
A stronger incompatibility result concerning postulate
(DP2) can be established as well. First however, the follow-






Figure 1: Abstract visualization of the worlds appearing in the
proof of Theorem 1. Same color indicates identical propositional
variables between worlds.
Definition 6 (Non-Trivially Confined Theory). We shall say
that a theoryK of L is non-trivially confined iffK is confined
to a sublanguage L0 of L, and, moreover, L0 contains at least
two propositional variables.
Clearly, if a theory of L is non-trivially confined, then the
set P contains at least three propositional variables.
Theorem 2. LetK be any splittable or non-trivially confined
theory of L, and let S be any belief state, associated with K.
There exists a sentence ' of L, such that no modified AGM
revision function  satisfies (P) at S and S  ', in addition to
postulate (DP2).
Proof. The proof is divided into two parts. The first part
corresponds to the case of any splittable theory K, such that,
for some contingent sentences x; y 2 L, K = Cn(x; y)
and Lx \ Ly = ?. The second part corresponds to the case
of any non-trivially confined theory K, such that, for some
contingent sentence x 2 L, K = Cn(x) and Lx  L.
Part I: Splittable Theory — K = Cn(x;y)
This part of the proof is identical to the proof of The-
orem 1, concerning the violation of (R2), as the fact that
r S r00 and r0 S r00 holds for any belief state S associated
with any splittable theory K.
Part II: Non-Trivially Confined Theory — K = Cn(x)
We will show that, for any belief state S associated with
K, there exists a sentence ' of L, such that the transition
from S to S' cannot obey the dictates of (SQ1)–(SQ2),
in addition to the dictates of (R2).
To this end, consider any belief state S, such that B(S) =
K, and assume that (SQ1)–(SQ2) and (R2) are satisfied.
Since B(S) is non-trivially confined to Lx, it follows that Lx
contains at least two propositional variables, and, moreover,
there exist at least four worlds outside [B(S)], such that they
agree on all propositional variables in Lx.
Let r be a world outside [B(S)]. Consider the world r0 =2
[B(S)], such that it agrees on all propositional variables with
r, except from one variable of Lx. Moreover, consider the
world r00 =2 [B(S)], such that it agrees on all propositional
variables with r0, except from one variable of Lx, and r00 6= r
(see Figure 2).8 Then, by the choice of r; r0; r00 (that they
are outside [B(S)] and agree on all propositional variables
in Lx) and since theory B(S) knows nothing about Lx (i.e.,
there is no sentence  2 Lx, such that B(S) j= ), we have
that ? 6= Diff (B(S); r) = Diff (B(S); r0) = Diff (B(S); r00)
 Lx, Diff (r; r0) \ Diff (B(S); r) = ?, and Diff (r0; r00) \
Diff (B(S); r0) = ?. Hence from (SQ2), r S r0 S r00.
Now, define ' to be the sentence ' = r. Therefore from
( ), it follows that B(S ') = frg. Then, by the choice
of r; r0; r00, we derive that Diff
 
B(S '); r0 = Diff (r; r0) 
Diff
 
B(S '); r00 = Diff (r; r00). Hence, no matter what the
new faithful preorder S' is, as long as it satisfies (SQ1), it
holds that r0 S' r00.
However, given that r0; r00 2 [:'] and r0 S r00, (R2)
entails that r0 S' r00. Contradiction. 
8It is not hard to verify that the worlds r; r0; r00 indeed exist.






Figure 2: Abstract visualization of the worlds appearing in the
proof of Theorem 2 (Part II). Same color indicates identical
propositional variables between worlds.
Theorems 1 and 2, essentially, entail that there exists
no modified AGM revision function of any type, satisfying
Parikh’s relevance-sensitive axiom (P) in addition to the DP
postulates.
5 Corollaries
The incompatibility results of the previous section affect
other existing belief-revision proposals.
5.1 Parametrized Difference Revision Operators
Parametrized Difference revision operators (abbrev. PD op-
erators) is an important family of operators, recently intro-
duced in [Peppas and Williams, 2016; 2018] as a generaliza-
tion of Dalal’s concrete revision operator [Dalal, 1988]. It
was shown in [Peppas and Williams, 2016] that PD operators
satisfy (wP).9 Thus, in view of Theorems 1 and 2, we obtain
immediately the following two corollaries:10
Corollary 1. Parametrized Difference revision operators are
inconsistent with the DP postulates.
Corollary 2. Dalal’s revision operator is inconsistent with
the DP postulates.
PD operators, as well as Dalal’s operator, are based on a
simple and intuitive construction, and they are the only among
a series of popular operators (including the ones in [Borgida,
1985], [Winslett, 1988] and [Satoh, 1988]) that satisfy the full
set of (modified) AGM postulates for revision. Obviously,
having such “well-behaved” revision operators violating the
DP postulates is a major drawback.
5.2 The Independence Postulate
The Independence postulate (Ind) was introduced to remedy
problems with the DP ones [Jin and Thielscher, 2007].
(Ind) If : 62 B(S  '), then  2 B (S   )  '.
The possible-world characterization of (Ind) is as follows:
(IndR) If r 2 ['] and r0 2 [:'], then r S r0 entails r S' r0.
It has been shown in [Jin and Thielscher, 2007] that (Ind)
implies both (DP3) and (DP4); hence, the following corollary
is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1.
Corollary 3. Parikh’s axiom (P) is inconsistent with the In-
dependence postulate (Ind).
9In [Aravanis et al., 2019], it was shown that PD operators satisfy
strong (P) as well.
10Although PD operators and Dalal’s operator were introduced in
terms of belief sets, they can straightforwardly be recast in terms of
belief states, as it was done for conditions (wP) and (SQ1)–(SQ2).
5.3 Spohn’s Conditionalization
Spohn uses a quantitative structure for representing a belief
state, related to a belief set. He calls this structure ordinal
conditional function (OCF) [Spohn, 1988].
Definition 7 (OCF, [Spohn, 1988]). An OCF  is a function
from the set M of possible worlds to the class of ordinals,
such that at least one world is assigned the ordinal 0.
Intuitively,  assigns a plausibility grading to worlds; the
larger (r) is for a world r, the less plausible r is. This plau-
sibility grading can be extended to sentences; i.e., for any
contingent sentence ' 2 L, (') = min f(r) : r 2 [']g.
Lastly, the most plausible worlds define the belief set B()
that  is related to; i.e., B() = th
 fr 2M : (r) = 0g.
Given an OCF , the new information ', and the degree
of firmness d > 0 with which ' is incorporated into the new
OCF   h'; di, Spohn’s conditionalization is as follows:
  h'; di(r) =

(r)  (') if r 2 [']
(r)  (:') + d if r 2 [:']
Darwiche and Pearl showed that (DP1)–(DP4) are satisfied
by Spohn’s proposal, restricted to the principal case of revi-
sion scenarios (where (') > 0, (:') = 0 and d > 0) [Dar-
wiche and Pearl, 1997]. Roughly speaking, this was achieved
by constructing an OCF-based revision operator, herein de-
noted by , and proving that  satisfies (DP1)–(DP4) (in ad-
dition to the modified AGM postulates for revision).11
Therefore, in view of Theorems 1 and 2, we obtain imme-
diately the following result, that indicates the inconsistency
between Spohn’s conditionalization (as expressed by means
of ) and Parikh’s relevance-sensitive axiom (P).
Corollary 4. Revision operator  does not satisfy axiom (P).
6 Belief States and Total Preorders
A belief state represents the current beliefs of an agent. Fur-
thermore, it contains preference information which guides the
revision process. This information is usually represented by
a total preorder over all possible worlds. In this section, we
study the relation between belief states and total preorders.
With the assumption that each total preorder of the lan-
guage is associated with exactly one belief state, there is a set
 of belief states, such that it contains belief states that are
in a one-to-one correspondence with the preorders. We shall
say that such a set  is a simple set of belief states.
On the other hand, if each preorder is associated with
finitely many belief states, then more belief states arise (since
two distinct belief states could be associated with the same
preorder), which are contained in a “wider” (and obviously
not simple) set 0 of belief states, such that jj < j0j.
Clearly then, there are two setsR andR0 of modified AGM
revision functions satisfying the DP postulates, and defined
over the domains  and 0, respectively.
Subsequently, we show that there exist revision policies en-
coded in the revision functions of R0 (hence, aligned with the
DP postulates), that cannot be “captured” by means of the re-
vision functions of R. This is accomplished in Theorem 3,
utilizing the notion of “simulation” defined below.
11See Theorem 14 in [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997] for more details.








Figure 3: Transitions between belief states via 0.
Definition 8 (Simulation). Let  be a simple set of belief
states, 0 be a “wider” set of belief states such that jj <
j0j, and , 0 be two modified AGM revision functions de-
fined over , 0, respectively. We shall say that  simulates
0 iff there exists a function f from 0 to , such that, for
every belief state S0 2 0 and for all sequences of sentences
'1; : : : ; 'n of L, it holds that B
 





(f(S0)  '1)      'n

.
Informally, the function  simulates the function 0 iff, for
every belief state in 0 (the input of 0), there exists a belief
state in  (the input of ), such that, for any sequence of
sentences,  and 0 present the same behaviour (with respect
to the belief content of the resulting belief states).
Theorem 3. Let  be a simple set of belief states, and let
0 be a “wider” set of belief states, such that jj < j0j.
There exists a modified AGM revision function 0 satisfying
the DP postulates, defined over 0, that cannot be simulated
by any modified AGM revision function  satisfying the DP
postulates, defined over .
Proof. Assume that P = fa; b; cg, and that 1, 2, 3 are



















abc 3 abcabc 3
abc
abc
3 abcabc 3 abc
Consider four belief states S1, S2, S3 and S4 of 0. We
assign at S1 and S4 the same preorder 1, at S2 the preorder
2, and at S3 the preorder 3. For simplicity, we assume
that each one of the remaining preorders overM is associated
with exactly one belief state. Clearly then, 0 is not a simple
set of belief states.
Suppose now that, for a modified AGM revision function
0, defined over 0, it holds that S1 0 :a = S2, S2 0 a = S4,
and S4 0 :a = S3, as depicted in Figure 3.
Observe that these three transitions satisfy (DP1)–(DP4).
Moreover, observe that B
 
(((S1 0 :a) 0 a) 0 :a) 0 (a _
:b_:c) = B ((S20a)0:a)0 (a_:b_:c) = B (S40
12For the sake of readability, possible worlds are represented as
sequences (rather than sets) of literals, and the negation of a propo-
sitional variable p is represented as p (instead of :p).
:a)0 (a_:b_:c) = B S3 0 (a_:b_:c) = Cn (:a^
:b ^ c) _ (:a ^ b ^ :c).
Next, we show that there is no modified AGM revision
function satisfying the DP postulates, defined over the sim-
ple set of belief states , that simulates 0.
First, let us denote by Q1, Q2, Q3 the belief states of 
that correspond to the preorders 1, 2, 3, respectively.
Now, assume, towards contradiction, that there exists a
modified AGM revision function  satisfying (DP1)–(DP4),
defined over , that simulates 0. It is not hard to verify that,
in order for  to simulate 0, it must hold that Q1  :a = Q2
and Q2  a = Q1. Then, B
 
(((Q1  :a)  a)  :a) 
(a _ :b _ :c) = B ((Q2  a)  :a)  (a _ :b _ :c) =
B
 









(:a ^ :b ^ c) _ (:a ^ b ^ :c) _ (a ^ b ^ c) 6=
B
 
(((S1 0:a)0 a)0:a)0 (a_:b_:c)

, which is clearly
a contradiction. 
Theorem 3 indicates that a total preorder over worlds is not
a sufficient representation for a belief state, in order to achieve
“full coverage” of DP-compliant revision policies. This “non-
reductionist” thesis was also recently supported in [Booth and
Chandler, 2017; 2018], where it is argued that “a preference
ordering over the set of possible worlds provides insufficient
structure to represent an agent’s commitments to policies of
iterated revision” [Booth and Chandler, 2017, p. 413].
7 Conclusion
In this article, important observations on the DP approach
were pointed out. At first, we generalized the conflicts be-
tween relevance-sensitive and iterated belief revision, prov-
ing that there is no modified AGM revision function of any
type, satisfying axiom (P) in addition to the DP postulates.
These fully-fledged incompatibilities imply significant corol-
laries; PD operators and Dalal’s operator are incompatible
with the DP approach, as well as the Independence postulate
and Spohn’s conditionalization (restricted to revision scenar-
ios) are incompatible with axiom (P). Lastly, we shed more
light on the nature of belief states, by showing that a prefer-
ence ordering (over possible worlds) is an insufficient struc-
ture for representing a belief state, as the DP postulates allow
for more revision polices than the ones that can be captured
by identifying belief states with total preorders over worlds.
Arguably, iteration and relevance play a central role in the
revision process. The established results show that the dom-
inant models for these two aspects of belief revision are in a
deep conflict. Undoubtedly however, any comprehensive for-
mal framework for belief change would need to consistently
combine iterated and relevance-sensitive belief revision.
Finding ways to reconcile iteration and relevance — either
by weakening the involved postulates or by following an en-
tirely new approach — as well as identifying the exact nature
of a belief state constitute imperative future tasks.
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